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ABSTRACT 
 
A Design Approach to a Risk Review for Fuel Cell-Based Distributed Cogeneration Systems. 
(May 2004) 
Kristin Lyn Luthringer, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas Lalk 
 
A risk review of a fuel cell-based distributed co-generation (FC-Based DCG) system was 
conducted to identify and quantify the major technological system risks in a worst-case 
scenario.  A risk review entails both a risk assessment and a risk analysis of a designed 
system, and it is part of risk engineering.  Thorough literature reviews and expert interviews 
were conducted in the field of fuel cells.  A thorough literature review of the risk engineering 
field was also conducted.  A procedure for a risk review of the FC-Based DCG System was 
developed.  The representative system design was identified by the current DCG design 
technology.  The risk assessment was carried out, identifying the system components and 
potential failure modes and consequences.  Then, using probabilities of failure for the 
various system components, the risk associated with a particular system design was 
determined. 
A Monte Carlo simulation on the total system reliability was used to evaluate the potential 
for system failure at a time of 1 hour, 5 hours, 10 hours, 50 hours, 100 hours and 500 hours 
of continuous operation.  The original system was found to be acceptable at the initial times, 
but after 100 hours was predicted to fail.  The components which consistently contribute 
significantly to the overall system risk are the membrane electrode assembly (MEA) and the 
nickel-metal foam flow fields.  A revised system was analyzed with the reliability of the MEA 
and the Ni-foam set to 100%.  After the revision, the components which contributed 
significantly to the system risk were the pumps.   Simulations were run for several alternative 
systems to provide feedback on risk management suggestions.  The risk engineering process 
developed with the design approach for this research is applicable to any system and it 
accommodates the use of many different risk engineering tools. 
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1INTRODUCTION 
The current primary system for creating electricity in the United States is by generation at 
centralized large-scale power plants, using various methods.  Electricity delivery presently 
occurs as allocation from the central plant through a grid of power lines, a power 
conditioning system, and transmission-boosting substations to the end user.  Since 
deregulation of the energy market took effect the electric companies have argued over who 
will maintain this aging grid infrastructure and few are willing to heavily invest in repairs or 
in expansion.  The centralized power plants have very high capital costs to build and have 
long lead-times to install and bring up to full capacity so there is a reduced incentive to build 
new plants.  So, as the demand for electricity keeps increasing, the centralized system is slow 
to respond.  Another reason that centralized power plants are not being built is that the 
traditional thought process of NIMBY, or not in my backyard, has moved to BANANA, or 
build absolutely nothing anywhere near anybody, due to the widespread public fear of living 
near high-voltage power lines.  Still, Americans have grown used to having their electricity 
readily available and do not like being subjected to “brown-outs” or periods of no/low 
power due to a peak in electricity demand or a problem with the grid.  One method 
proposed to boost electrical generation without the stigma of centralized plants and to 
provide better availability for the small, residential consumer is through the use of 
distributed generation – small-scale electricity generation for the individual residence or for a 
small group of users.  With the smaller transmission distance between the source and the 
end user it becomes cost-effective to use the waste energy from the distributed electricity 
generation processes at the residence.  This dual use leads to the term distributed co-
generation (DCG) system, alternatively called a combined heat and power system, and it can 
lead to a higher thermal efficiency.  Since FC-Based DCG is an emerging market in the 
energy industry, having a means to determine whether or not a particular system’s 
configuration and implementation will likely be successful while still in the design stages 
would be invaluable as far as the costs and person-hours potentially saved from a “lessons-
learned” experience.   One method to evaluate the system design is to use risk. 
The objective of this research was to utilize risk engineering in order to determine the 
current FC-Based DCG design parameters and operating conditions that contribute the 
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most to the technological system risk.  This was accomplished by using the design approach 
to organize, systematize, and clarify all the background information for risk engineering and 
then applying the risk review portion of the risk engineering process to an example FC-
Based DCG system. 
This thesis is structured in order to discuss the pertinent aspects of the risk review for a 
FC-based DCG system which is a part of the larger risk engineering process.  The 
characteristics of the risk engineering process will be noted using a design approach.  Then, 
the current status of FC-Based DCG systems will be explored.  Next, the specific functions 
and procedure for the two research focus areas will be presented as the risk engineering 
process is applied for FC-Based DCG.  Finally, the results will be discussed and conclusions 
drawn. 
Characteristics of Risk Engineering 
The general objective of the risk engineering process is to understand what events can 
happen to a designed system, how likely it is that the events might happen, the consequences 
that could occur if the events happen, and the confidence in predicting the answers.  Risk 
engineering is a useful tool because it reduces waste of product, raw materials, and human 
resources.  It can increase the chance of remaining in business and making a profit in the 
market by potentially preventing failure through design, improving overall safety, and 
increasing reliability of equipment.  By identifying areas where the risk can be controlled, 
essentially where the possibility of failure can be reduced and/or where the consequences of 
the failures can be mitigated, risk reviews feed information to risk management.  It is risk 
management that is then charged with ensuring the risk associated with the design is 
acceptable.  When implemented correctly, the risk engineering process will result in 
improved public image and in avoidance of possible legal problems by increasing product 
reliability. 
There are several key benefits that a risk engineering process can specifically bring to 
DCG.  The benefits include providing comparisons of alternative configurations in order to 
create a better design of the system, providing identification of alternative procedures, and 
providing documented and logical evaluation of trade-offs involved in the decision making 
process.  These benefits would allow the risk management portion of the engineering 
process to provide the emerging DCG market with a design tool that can be used to 
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troubleshoot the system design before creating the beta-test (preproduction) prototype for 
initial trials.  The risk review portion of risk engineering should enable identification of 
which of the technical barriers can be overcome (failure prevention) and which are the most 
likely failure modes that should be mitigated.  The risk management portion of risk 
engineering should present suggestions to make the system more reliable and safer.  Many 
industries use risk engineering as a tool in their daily operations and planning operations 
because of its many benefits.  [1]  Table 1 below lists several industries that currently use 
some form of risk engineering in their decision making process. 
 
Table 1: Industries that Use Risk Engineering [1] 
Aerospace Construction 
Consulting Education 
Energy, Oil & Gas Environmental 
Finance & Financial Planning Facilities  
Government Insurance 
Medical Devices & Healthcare Military 
Project & Cost Management Pharmaceutical 
Public Policy Research Real Estate 
Semiconductor & Microelectronics  Technology 
Telecom Utilities 
 
 
Defining “risk” is difficult because the general meaning is vague.  Everyone has his or her 
own interpretation of what is “risky”!  A literature review of the field of risk analysis 
demonstrates that there is not much consensus even among the experts.  Much discussion 
centers around defining what the relevant risks are for the different situations to be analyzed 
and what weight to put on the values that will ultimately be used to evaluate those risks.  
There is also dissention on which is the best method to use in a certain situation.  The 
methodology of an engineering design approach should be a very useful tool in combining 
the risk engineering knowledge into a cohesive process.  Since most risk personnel agree 
upon the principles of risk engineering but disagree on the details, the systematic design 
approach can give a framework of issues to address in risk engineering while leaving open 
the choice of tools to use when implementing the risk assessment, risk analysis, or risk 
management.   
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One key idea to take from the experts is to define upfront the type of risks at which one is 
looking and the magnitudes of the potential consequences.  An important fact to keep in 
mind is that different kinds of risk exist, and it is the perception of those risks that is reality.  
The actual risks pertaining to a design can be overstated or understated by how the design is 
viewed.  Many of the aspects surrounding a technology, such as market pressure from 
consumers or product/company safety records, can change how the public views the risk 
associated with a particular design.  Figure 1 below graphically demonstrates the external 
pressures that affect how the public perceives a risk. 
 
 
Figure 1: Factors Affecting the Perception of Risk [2] 
 
The difficulty in defining risk is compounded further because several types of risk exist.  
There is technical risk – associated with the equipment, technology, and science of systems; 
programmatic risk – including operational hazards and safety of designs; supportability risk – 
associated with marketability and viability concerns; cost risk – connected with financial 
impact in all aspects of the system; schedule risk – including the time impact of the design 
lifecycle; and political risk – associated with public opinion and governmental regulations.  
All types of risk can be factored into the relative riskiness of a project.  A general engineering 
division would be primarily focused on technical risk and to some extent programmatic risk.  
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Even so, engineers must be aware of the other types of risk as they may also affect the total 
perceived risk of a project much like the aforementioned pressures on public risk perception. 
Specific definitions of key vocabulary are needed in order to minimize confusion among 
risk engineers, who are the practitioners of risk assessment, risk analysis or risk management 
in an engineering design company.  Risk is defined to be the probability of occurrence and 
the consequences of an undesirable event, part of which can be reduced by design, part of 
which can be reduced by transfer, and the remaining residual, or “leftover”, risk that must be 
less than some tolerable level.  [2]  When this residual risk is greater than the tolerable level, 
the project is too risky to pursue.  Still, some other measures of risk control may exist that, 
when implemented, would reduce that residual risk to acceptable levels.  The undesirable 
event is defined to be the occurrence of a failure, a partially unsuccessful occurrence, a 
problem, an accident, a loss, damage, or danger.  The probability is defined to be the 
likelihood of occurrence, and the consequences are defined to be the effects of the 
occurrence.  The harmful effects of the occurrence of an undesirable event are usually of 
concern to engineers trying to prevent failure of their designs, whereas the non-harmful 
effects are not given a priority.  This identifies an important point commonly misunderstood 
by the public – if an undesirable event is not harmful, then it is not a true risk.  Likewise a 
hazard, or unsafe condition, is only a risk if someone or something is exposed to it.  [3]  Risk 
engineering is defined to be all the paraphernalia, procedures, tools, representations, and 
actions that involve the application of a broad spectrum of sciences in order to solve 
problems that must accomplish multiple, contradictory goals.  [4] 
A design approach to the risk engineering process has been taken to determine the best 
procedure to adopt.  This entails taking the need for risk engineering, determining the top-
level functions required to fulfill that need, and decomposing those top functions into lower-
level functions.  The function structure is a useful device to accomplish the functional 
decomposition in which the relationships between the necessary functions can be easily 
observed.  It is also constructive to determine what needs to be done before deciding on 
how to proceed.  This format potentially allows for the use of different risk-related tools 
when evaluating various designs in diverse situations.  The function structure also displays 
the chronological process of risk engineering when read left to right.   
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It is useful to note the differences between risk engineering from a design approach and 
traditional risk methodologies.  In the traditional way of conducting risk engineering, 
information is widely scattered and tool-specific (focused on PRA, FMEA, etc.).  The 
documentation must be consciously generated and isn’t always organized but is definitely 
needed for traceability and legal defenses.  Some risk engineers have a dedication to specific 
risk tools with which they are very familiar.  This sometimes results in information from 
which risk management is not easily carried out.  On the other hand, this design approach to 
risk engineering allows entrants to risk engineering to understand what is needed (in 
analysis), to learn and apply the tools rapidly, and to minimize inadvertent omission of key 
points.  A logical, defensible display of the risk engineering decisions is easily obtained.  
Also, this approach ensures the risk review produces information that is usable in risk 
management. 
It is also useful to note some important differences in risk assessment and analysis as 
defined here and the words as defined by the prominent risk methodology prescribed by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  For this research, the focus is on a 
company’s design risk as it would be addressed within a department and risk assessment 
describes the first, qualitative part of a risk review while risk analysis refers to the second, 
quantitative part.  The EPA is primarily focused on human health risk and therefore the 
EPA risk assessment guidelines (RAGS) treat assessment and analysis as interchangeable 
words.  The four functions under an EPA-prescribed risk assessment are hazard 
identification, toxicity (or dose-response) assessment, exposure assessment, and risk 
characterization.  The EPA focus is also more on the cancer and non-cancer (illness) effects 
of anthropogenic and natural chemicals in the environment, whereas the risk engineering 
process looks for all the potential end states of the design and tries to ensure a successful 
system.  [3]  While this format works for a remedial situation where the damage is already 
done, it is not very useful for trying to troubleshoot a design in order to prevent damage. 
Returning to the design approach, the three major functions of a risk engineering process 
necessary to achieve the objective are reviewing risk in the design, creating documentation of 
the risk, and managing (optimizing) the risk.  Reviewing risk in the system entails both 
assessment and analysis.   
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Creating documentation entails first understanding what is useful information, then 
obtaining, organizing, and presenting that information in a constructive manner.  This 
second top function is necessary to ensure the data and ideas from the risk review function 
are useable by the risk management function and that the potential design solutions to 
optimize the risk from the risk management have enough information to be checked by 
another risk review.  If the other two top functions are done properly, this documentation 
can fall right out of the work without much effort.  Care must still be taken when presenting 
the risk information because if the documentation is improperly done, this can become a 
liability. 
Risk management entails evaluation of the risk data generated by the risk review, control 
of risk through prevention or mitigation (i.e. changing the system if the risk is unacceptable), 
and monitoring both the non-design elements of risk reduction and the residual (i.e. 
“leftover”) risk.  Since risk reduction by decreasing the occurrence of the effects is weighed 
against cost, an alternate way of looking at risk management is to think of it as implementing 
risk optimization.  Recommendations for design improvements should result from the risk 
review; however, the management function must be carried out by the implementer of the 
FC-Based DCG system (or the company owning the evaluated technology) according to 
their own values, practices, and policies. 
One of the major reasons for separation of the management function from the review 
function is to prevent bias in the risk review.  This could happen if by knowing that the 
company can only spend a certain amount of money in fixing a problem, a reviewer stopped 
assessing the system risk once a certain number of problems were found.  The functions as 
discussed to this point are relevant to all designs on which the risk engineering process can 
be used.  Further decomposition of the risk assessment and risk analysis functions under the 
risk review will be specific to the example FC-Based DCG design being reviewed and will 
illustrate the differences between the two processes.  Figure 2 on the following page is a 
function structure displaying the top functions and their relationships to one another as well 
as the breakdown on the risk engineering process as it could be applied to any system. 
 
  8 
 
Figure 2: Functions of the General Risk Engineering Process 
 
Now, one of the utilities of the function structure can be appreciated.  As can be readily 
seen in Figure 2, the function structure allows for design iterations (or “looping”) between 
risk management and risk review through the risk documentation. 
As part of the risk review, the functions of assessing risk and analyzing risk are the focus 
areas and will be discussed more in the research section of this thesis.  Recalling that when 
the risk review and the risk management functions are fulfilled properly the risk 
documentation naturally is completed, the next portion of the risk engineering process to 
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discuss is the risk management functions from Figure 2.  The three functions necessary in 
order to optimize risk are: evaluation of the risk review information, control of the calculated 
risks of concern, and monitoring both the changes and the residual risk in the system design.  
Risk evaluation connotes deciding what tolerable risk is.  The identification and decision of 
acceptability limits for the system design must be made within societal norms and with 
respect to the background levels of risk currently accepted by potential users of the design.  
At this point in the process, potential trade-offs in the system are identified.  Risk control is 
preventing or mitigating the risks of concern for the system.  Design mitigation changes try 
to ameliorate the effects of the failure but do not change the failure mode, like adding 
redundancy.  For example, an air bag does not prevent the car wreck but rather tries to 
ensure passenger safety during one.  On the other hand, design prevention changes modify 
the probability of the failure or even eliminate the failure mode itself, like adding a safety 
factor for ensuring material strength.  The identification of alternatives or other changes is 
decided upon at this stage.  Risk monitoring involves tracking the non-design risk reduction 
methods and the residual risk.  During this portion of the risk engineering process, such 
things as inspections, maintenance schedules, tracking checklists, or other procedural 
changes to transfer risk would be implemented.  It is important to identify the residual risk – 
the level of risk that is “leftover” once all design and non-design reduction methods have 
been implemented.  As mentioned previously, it is this residual risk that must be at or below 
the tolerable level determined in the risk evaluation portion in order to continue with the 
project.  The expected result of risk management is a system design optimized for the 
minimal risk with respect to minimal cost.  [5]  The trade-off criteria and the design changes 
to optimize risk will have been identified.  Alternative configurations and/or components 
will have been proposed and the best ones chosen for implementation.  The controls to 
optimize the systems risk, such as inspections, procedures, tracking, etcetera, will have been 
proposed.  The final task to complete the risk engineering process objectives – the risk 
management portion – is truly one for an implementer of the system as only they are able to 
determine how much risk reduction is worth the cost to them. 
Before discussing the background information for FC-Based DCG, it is necessary to note 
that there is a large issue to consider when creating and performing a risk review.  This is 
summed up by the following quote: 
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Many risk-related decisions are driven by perceptions, not necessarily 
objective risk as defined by [calculations].  Perceptions of consequences 
tend to grow faster than the consequences themselves — that is, several 
small accidents are not perceived as strongly as one large one, even if 
fatalities are identical.  [5] 
 
Two major implications can be gleaned from this quote.  First, it is necessary not only to 
create a risk review of the system, but to do it right!  Sloppy work will lead to negative 
perceptions of the system, which is not good for either the design or the company producing 
the design.  It will also increase the difficulty in improving the design if risk managers try to 
use information generated by a poor risk review.  Second, risk engineers must use their 
hearts as well as their minds, especially when making judgments between alternatives.  If we 
omit from consideration the public perception of our work, a grounded engineering decision 
may appear to be without base. 
Characteristics of FC-Based DCG 
The method for boosting electrical generation and providing better availability for the 
small, residential consumer that is the focus of this research is distributed generation.  
Several current technologies already exist for the power plant of a DCG system, including 
the popular internal combustion (IC) engine.  If the IC engine were to be widely used for the 
power plant of a DCG system, the IC engine system would only increase the nation’s current 
dependence on foreign oil and it could potentially increase the well-known detrimental 
environmental effects by proliferation of IC engines.  Therefore, the research impetus has 
been for a fuel cell-based power plant in DCG systems due to the fact that fuel cell systems 
produce low emissions of pollutants and that water is the only byproduct.  Ideally, hydrogen 
fuel gas would be derived from electrolyzed water (with the electricity generated from 
renewable resources like solar, wind or geothermal); however it is currently reformed from 
natural gas or methanol.  The fact that the current government administration has shown 
great interest in a “hydrogen economy” has also added to the interest in FC-Based DCG. 
Several types of fuel cells exist today as option for use in DCG including Alkaline FCs, 
Phosphoric Acid FCs, Molten Carbonate FCs, Solid Oxide FCs, Regenerative FCs, Zinc Air 
FCs, and Protonic Ceramic FCs.  There are several advantages & disadvantages for each type 
of FC explained in [6].  The Center for Electrochemical Systems and Hydrogen Research 
(CESHR) at Texas A&M University has chosen the platform of the Polymer Electrolyte 
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Membrane, alternately called a Proton Exchange Membrane, for its fuel cell-based 
distributed co-generation (PEM FC-Based DCG) system using reformate fuel gas.  The 
CESHR system is the example design used in this risk review, therefore the characteristics of 
only the PEM FC are discussed.  How a typical PEM FC-Based DCG system would work 
starts with a description of the acid-based fuel cell itself.  An electrolyte that only allows the 
passage of hydrogen ions would be placed between an anode to which hydrogen gas is fed 
and a cathode to which oxygen is fed.  Hydrogen ions on the anode side of the cell would 
pass through the electrolyte while the electrons would pass through an electrical circuit.  On 
the cathode side of the electrolyte, the hydrogen ions would recombine with oxygen and the 
electrons forming water.  [6]  This typical system operation for a proton electrolyte is 
depicted by the anode & cathode reactions in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
Figure 3: Reaction Schematic for a Single Acid-Based Fuel Cell 
 
The anode-electrolyte-cathode layers in the diagram of Figure 3 create the membrane 
electrode assembly (MEA) for the FC.  One is able to combine a fuel cell in a series 
connection called a “stack” to increase the voltage output, but the current remains the same.  
A method of cell stacking employs a layer of conductive material known as a bipolar plate to 
join the anode side of one MEA to the cathode side of the next MEA in series.  This allows 
fuel channels to be machined onto both sides of the bipolar plate to feed the fuel gas and 
oxidizer to the appropriate sides of the MEA as well as cooling channels to be machined 
From Fuel Gas 
    Source 
2 H2 ? 4 H+ + 4 e–Anode 
Electrolyte 
Electrical 
Load 
O2 + 4 e– + 4 H+ ? 2 H2OCathode 
From Oxidizer 
Source 
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throughout the plate.  When fuel cells are stacked, a means to distribute that fuel gas and the 
oxidizer over the electrodes is needed to ensure that all areas of the MEA are utilized to 
generate electricity.  This has been accomplished in the past with graphite plates.  A 
combination of bipolar plates and nickel metal foam allows greater fuel/oxidizer distribution 
over electrode by providing a better flow field without losing efficiency in the series 
connections.  The CESHR system uses such a combination bipolar plate and Ni-Foam for 
its flow field and series connections.  The balance of plant (BOP) is all the remaining 
peripheral equipment used in the system such as: pumps, blowers, and/or compressors; 
intercoolers, pre-heaters, and/or heat exchangers; power conditioning, direct current (DC) 
to DC converters, a DC to alternating current (AC) inverter, and/or electric motors; fuel 
processing system (reformer, desulfurization, etc.); fuel storage system; control valves and 
pressure regulators; and controllers.  Top-level functions for the DCG system are the same 
regardless of the type of FC used as its power plant.  The system must: intake fuel, reform 
fuel to hydrogen/fuel gas/reformate, control fuel cell operation, condition generated power 
to clean AC, output power, interface with a grid network, provide energy storage for start-up 
and excess loads/peaks for when not connected to a grid, and provide a marketable 
alternative to other, centralized power sources. [7] 
A further look into the CESHR DCG system design shows much more than a single PEM 
FC.   Figure 4 on the following page depicts the parts of the fuel cell stack that CESHR will 
use for its DCG System, including bipolar plates, nickel foam assemblies, and MEA, where 
the MEA consists of a polymer electrolyte, and two electrodes. 
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Figure 4: Fuel Cell Stack Schematic 
 
The current general BOP configuration for the CESHR system consists of a reformed 
methane (natural gas) fuel supply system, a bipolar plate-delivered water-glycol cooling 
system for cogeneration, and a DC/AC power conditioning inverter system.  The full system 
schematic in Figure 5 on the following page displays all the equipment needed, minus the 
control system.  A full prototype commercial unit has not yet been built, so the diagram that 
follows is simply the planned system. 
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Figure 5: Distributed Cogeneration System Schematic 
 
Currently, there exist many benefits and barriers for DCG systems in general and 
specifically for FC-Based DCG systems.  Some of the many benefits for DCG systems are: 
reliability, cogeneration, site flexibility, peak power shaving, emergency/back-up power, and 
short lead times.  Some advantages with respect to FC-based DCG applications are: minimal 
noise/vibration, power quality, high power densities, fuel flexibility, modularity, popularity, 
and some FC types have a quick response to load variations.  Some of the barriers to 
implementation of DCG systems are: grid interface, ownership, safety, auxiliary energy 
storage, and possible regulatory barriers.  Some disadvantages with respect to FC-Based 
DCG applications are: technical barriers, high cost (use of platinum, “prototype” 
manufacturing), sensitivity to fuel impurities, and maintenance.  [7]  These issues are mostly 
self-explanatory for those involved with fuel cells.  For the novice, the reference by 
Lariminie or the one by McKinley will provide further insight.  The FC-Based DCG system 
is still in the design stages and therefore makes an ideal system to apply the benefits of the 
risk engineering process.  That is, the risk engineering process can be most effective before 
the design is finalized. 
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FUNCTIONS & PROCEDURE 
To reiterate, the objective of this research was to utilize risk engineering in order to 
determine the current FC-Based DCG design parameters and operating conditions that 
contribute the most to the technological system risk.  The first step in organizing the risk 
engineering process with the design approach is to understand what the goals of risk 
engineering are.  Most experts in all fields of risk engineering will agree upon the following 
three aims.  The general purposes for the risk engineering process are to identify the risks 
involved in the system, to categorize those risks by consequences and likelihood, and to 
effect changes, if necessary, thereby reducing the risks below background levels.  The focus 
of this research project will be only on the first two, identifying and categorizing risks, rather 
than on the final aim, implementing risk reduction for the system design.  Applying the 
design process at this point, the research objective and risk purposes are therefore stated as 
dual aspects of the following need statement for the CESHR example system: 
There exists a need to identify the risks involved with a fuel cell-based 
distributed co-generation system using reformed natural gas and to 
categorize those risks in order to use them as a decision tool for selecting 
between different design configurations. 
 
The necessary tasks to satisfy the need are: (1) to identify the necessary elements of a risk 
engineering process, (2) to develop a procedure for reviewing risk, (3) to perform both a risk 
assessment and a risk analysis on at least one example system configuration to test the 
procedure, and (4) to make recommendations according to the data generated from the 
analysis. 
The first task, identification of the necessary elements of the risk engineering process, has 
already been completed with the aforementioned functions of risk engineering.  Figure 6 on 
the following page shows the top-level functions only. 
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Figure 6: Top-Level Functions of the Risk Engineering Process 
 
While advocating some changes to the process used by the EPA and traditional 
methodologies, this risk engineering process holds true to the objectives and allows for 
creativity in finding the problems and solutions in a system.  The initial part of the risk 
engineering process is the risk review, which is the research focus so it will only be briefly 
discussed here.  In any system, the risk review must start by identifying and categorizing risks 
in order to meet the process objectives.  So, the risk review is further broken into assessing 
risk and analyzing risk as to what needs to be done in order to identify and categorize the 
risk associated with the alternative system configurations for FC-Based DCG.  A literature 
review of current Department of Energy (DOE) and industry risk practices for fuel cells 
turned up only a utility function for a solid oxide fuel cell [8], so there are no published 
precedents for a risk review specific to this system of FC-Based DCG.  The next two 
subsections show the completion of the second and third tasks for the risk assessment and 
the risk analysis, respectively.  Any recommendations generated by the risk review in 
completion of the fourth task feed directly into the risk management portion of risk 
engineering. 
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Risk Review Assessment Procedure & Example Application 
The risk engineering procedure for risk assessment, as shown by the functional 
decomposition in Figure 7 below, centers on the idea that assessment is a qualitative measure 
of a system’s risk.  A “top-down” identification and characterization of an example risky 
scenario was conducted using a literature review of current FC-Based DCG technology 
system configurations and operational characteristics as well as informal interviews of the 
CESHR personnel.  The function structure below is a dissection of the risk assessment 
function discussed in Figure 2 as it applies to FC-Based DCG.  This function structure 
illustrates the utility of the top-down design process for risk engineering, in that it allows for 
a determination of what needs to be considered before deciding how to handle it. 
 
 
Figure 7: Risk Review Assessment Functions (Research Focus) 
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Some typical methodologies employed for this stage of a risk review are: fault tree analysis, 
potential failure modes and effects analysis, expert interviews, risk templates, and lessons 
learned. 
Since there are currently many different ways that could be used to configure and operate 
the FC-Based DCG, each scenario from the risk assessment should be of the form of a set 
of specific physical system configurations (PC), operating characteristics (OC), legal 
requirements (LR), failure modes (FM), failure events (FE), and potential failure 
consequences (PFC).  On way to represent this is using the set in Equation (1) where each 
capital letter combination is the set of characteristics (or failures) for the specific design for 
which the risk is to be determined. 
  (1) { PFCFEFMLROCPC ,,,,, }
}
So, the physical system configuration set is of the form of Equation (2) for N such 
parameters needed to define the design that will be analyzed.  
  (2) { NpcpcpcPC ,,, 21 K=
At this point in the design of a risk review process, the identification of the system to be 
analyzed begins.  The function structure shown in Figure 7 provides a logical hierarchy of 
steps to identify the system risks.  Beginning with the system identification, the PCs must be 
identified from the understanding of the system design for the physical configuration.  
However, the function structure as shown in Figure 7 is not yet at its lowest level for the 
design of the subsystems of the FC-Based DCG system.  The functions for the 
understanding of the physical system need to be broken down (decomposed) further to get 
specific functions that need to be satisfied by the DCG system.  This method allows for 
different components to be used, so the procedure could be applied to systems other than 
the CESHR example presented here. 
Following the procedure outlined by the breakdown in Figure 7 above, the next series of 
figures will depict the design functions (i.e. what would need to be addressed in the physical 
system design).   From the design, the CESHR system components for each respective 
subsystem will be identified. 
This process brings up an interesting characteristic of function structures in that a single 
component may fulfill more than one function or multiple components may be needed to 
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perform one function.  Multi-functional components may have a lower reliability than single 
function ones, as this increases the complexity of the system and introduces more potential 
failure modes.  The first subsystem design to understand is the fuel cell subsystem.  This 
subsystem design is represented by Figure 8 below. 
 
 
Figure 8: PEM Fuel Cell Stack Subsystem Functions 
 
The second subsystem design to understand is the fuel subsystem.  This subsystem design 
is represented by Figure 9 on the following page. 
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Figure 9: Fuel Subsystem Functions for Fuel Gas & Oxidizer 
 
The third subsystem design to understand is the exhaust subsystem.  This subsystem 
design is represented by Figure 10 on the following page. 
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Figure 10: Exhaust Subsystem Functions 
 
The fourth subsystem design to understand is the power conditioning subsystem.  This 
subsystem design is represented by Figure 11 below. 
 
 
Figure 11: Power Conditioning Functions 
 
The final subsystem design to understand is the control subsystem.  This subsystem design 
is represented by Figure 12 on the following page. 
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Figure 12: Control Systems Functions  
 
Notice that by defining what each subsystem must do before defining the components of 
the system to be analyzed, the system design shown by Figures 8 through 12 allows for 
future parametric analysis where the components can be changed to determine the effect on 
the system reliability.  This demonstrates the utility of the design approach to risk 
engineering. 
The best way to describe all the PCs (physical configurations) of the FC-Based DCG 
System is to break down the components into their subsystems.  The diagram in Figure 13 
on the following page shows the same schematic of the DCG System shown in Figure 5, 
except that the shapes are now pattern-coded to highlight which components belong to what 
subsystem. 
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Figure 13: Subsystems of the FC-Based DCG System 
 
The system schematic of Figure 13 is useful, but it is obviously not in the form of a 
function structure.  The components of the FC-Based DCG system grouped by subsystem 
are shown as part of the risk assessment PC identification function structure in Figure 14 on 
the following page.  The function structure and the components are discussed below. 
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Figure 14: Identifying Physical Configuration of the FC-Based DCG System 
 
For ease of tracking the components, looking to a future analysis of other failure modes 
and/or operating conditions, each component is given a number (pci).  To start with the fuel 
cell subsystem, which are the striped components in Figure 13 and all components shown in 
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the fuel cell stack schematic of Figure 4, there are seven PCs.  In the CESHR system, a 
Membrane Electrode Assembly (MEA) performs the anode, electrolyte, and cathode 
functions.  Therefore pc1 is the MEA.  A nickel foam flow field assembly performs the 
functions of distributing the fuel gas and the oxidizer over the surface of the electrodes and 
of providing the connection to the power conditioning system.  Therefore, pc2 is the Ni-
Foam, where there are two for each MEA as shown previously in Figure 4.  Bipolar plates 
perform the functions of distributing the fuel (& air on the other side) and of conducting the 
electrons as a connection to the power conditioning system.  Therefore, pc3 is a bipolar 
plate, where there are one more plates than there are MEAs.  Gaskets & stack fasteners 
perform the function of blocking the reactants (i.e. not permitting the gases to leak out of 
the bipolar plates).  Therefore, pc4 is a rubber gasket, pc5 is a bolt and pc6 is a nut. Currently, 
twelve nuts and bolts hold the CESHR FC stack together, so that will be the amount used in 
the analysis following.  Threaded connections provide the means to receive the fuel gas and 
air, as well as the removal of waste air-water mixture.  Therefore, pc7 is three threaded 
connectors. 
The PC identification continues with the fuel subsystem, which is represented by all the 
grey components of Figure 13.   There are fourteen PCs depicting the fuel gas and air 
supply.  In the CESHR system, a particulate filter and a reverse osmosis filter perform the 
functions of purifying the water used in the reforming processes.  Therefore pc8 and pc9 are 
a water particulate filter and a reverse osmosis filter, respectively.  A pump is needed to input 
the water to the sulfur-rejection and natural gas (methane) reforming processes and two 
valves are needed to control the amount of water sent as well as the amount of natural gas 
sent.  Therefore, pc10 is a pump and pc11 is two control valves.  A particulate filter performs 
the function of purifying the air used in the reforming processes.  A second particulate filter 
is used for the air needed by the fuel cell, but it is the same kind as is used by the reformer. 
Therefore pc12 is two air particulate filters.  A light-duty compressor is used to deliver the 
purified air to the reformer.  Therefore pc13 is a light-duty compressor.  A desulfurizer within 
the reformer removes the sulfurous acid (H2SO3) from the natural gas thereby purifying the 
fuel gas.  In the CESHR system, an adiabatic reformer performs the functions of reforming 
and purifying the methane (CH4) into the fuel gas (H2).  Therefore pc14 is a desulfurizer & 
reformer.  A Root’s Blower is used to deliver the fuel gas to the fuel cell.  Therefore pc15 is a 
Root’s blower.  A regenerative blower performs the function of delivering the air to the fuel 
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cell. Therefore pc16 is a regenerative blower.  A humidifier is used to humidify the fuel gas 
before it is sent to the fuel cell.  A second humidifier is used to humidify the air.  Therefore 
pc17 and pc18 are a hydrogen humidifier and an oxygen humidifier, respectively.  A 1-way 
control valve meters the amount of fuel gas that is delivered to the fuel cell so that the stack 
runs rich.  Therefore pc19 is a 1-way control valve.  Tubing is the pathway for all the process 
fluids in the fuel (fuel gas and air) system. Therefore pc20 is tubing.  A heat exchanger that is 
part of a condenser takes the heat from the cathode waste stream and uses it to separately 
preheat the fuel gas and the air.  This component is a part of the exhaust system components 
and demonstrates how a single component can interface with the various parts of the 
function structure. 
For the components of the exhaust subsystem, which are white in Figure 13, there are 
eight PCs.  In the CESHR system, a heat exchanger/condenser takes the excess heat from 
the waste water & air and uses it to separately preheat the intake air & fuel gas as it 
condenses out the water from the waste stream.   This water is then available to perform the 
function of humidifying the warmed air and fuel gas.  Therefore pc21 is a heat 
exchanger/condenser.  In the CESHR system, a reservoir performs the function of ensuring 
the amount of water needed by the humidifiers is collected and the excess is discharged to 
the environment.  Therefore pc22 is a reservoir.  A pump performs the function of sending 
water to the humidifiers and a control valve ensures the correct amount is sent.  Therefore 
pc23 is a pump and pc24 is a control valve.  A compressor takes the excess fuel gas and feeds 
it back to the fuel cell through the 1-way control valve.  Therefore pc25 is a compressor.  In 
the CESHR system, a fuel cell cooler performs the function of accepting and removing FC 
heat using a pump to circulate a water-glycol mixture as the working fluid.  This is the 
component that allows for cogeneration to occur by exchanging the excess heat from the FC 
with water for the end user to create hot water.  Therefore pc26 is a fuel cell cooler and pc27 is 
a pump.  Tubing is the pathway for all the process fluids in the exhaust system. Therefore 
pc28 is tubing. 
In the power conditioning subsystem, which is represented by the hatched components in 
Figure 13, there are two PCs.  In the CESHR system, electrical wire and soldered 
connections perform the functions of receiving the electricity from the fuel cell at the 
bipolar plates and sending the electricity to the electrical load.  Therefore pc29 is wire.  In the 
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CESHR system, an inverter performs the functions of converting direct current to 
alternating current and cleaning any noise from the waveform.  Therefore pc30 is an inverter.   
Considering the control subsystem components, which are not in the schematic in Figure 
13, there are three PCs.  A master controller performs the functions of general control and 
interfacing with the component controllers.  The reformer subsystem, the fuel cell 
subsystem, and the inverter subsystem all are manufactured with their own controllers so the 
master controller would be in charge of sensing the positions of the various control valves 
and flow rates of the various pumps and blowers in order to ensure that all subsystems are 
interacting appropriately for the desired operating condition.  Therefore pc31 is a master 
controller and pc32 is the various sensors.  The actuators (control valves, compressors and 
pumps) have already been identified within their respective subsystems.  In the CESHR 
system, electrical wire and soldered connections perform the functions of interfacing (i.e. 
sending and receiving the electrical signals) the controllers to the components.  Therefore 
pc33 is wire. 
Now, to explain a few notes on the procedure that was just used.   In the example system, 
pc1 through pc7 refer to the type of fuel cell used, which was a Polymer Exchange Membrane 
in this case, but it could have been any of the other types, such as Solid Oxide.  This process 
also works for different components within the PEM type fuel cell; instead of a nickel foam 
flow field assembly, a graphite plate could have been used.  Similarly, pc8 through pc20 refer 
to the type of fuel gas system, which was reformate in this case, but it could have been pure 
hydrogen. 
Continuing with the identification of the system to be analyzed, the conditions in which 
the system is operating must be identified.  There are several operating conditions (variable 
OC) in which the FC-Based DCG system could be evaluated for the risk assessment.  There 
is the operating condition of startup, or the initial run, which is of interest because the 
system or its components can have “infant mortality” due to such causes as manufacturing 
defects.  The next operating condition is that of constant running, where excess electricity is 
fed back to the grid or to a battery bank for peak shaving.  This is the OC of choice for the 
example FC-Based DCG system.  Another operating condition is that of intermittent 
running; where the DCG system acts like an air conditioner which cycles on when needed 
and off when the demand has been met.  The final operating condition that could be 
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consider is shut down, or decommissioning.  Several systems require a very specific set of 
shut-off procedures when they will not be used again, and this may be the case with the 
DCG system.  The following Figure 15 shows all the OCs for the FC-Based DCG system, 
where the research focus of continuous operation is shadowed and the operational sequence 
for that function is further decomposed. 
 
 
Figure 15: Identifying Operating Characteristics & Research Focus 
 
The next attribute to identify in the system for the risk assessment are the legal 
requirements (variable LR), which are primarily a programmatic risk dealing with whether or 
not the system is in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.  For this research, 
the current CESHR configuration is assumed to be in compliance with all governing laws 
and regulations.  If the laws were to change, then the PCs or the OCs would change to meet 
the new demands, and a new risk review would need to be performed on the new 
configuration. 
Following the hierarchy of steps to identify the system risks, as shown in Figure 6, several 
parts must be completed in order to characterize the system risk.  Failure modes of the 
components, sequences of events that could lead to failure, component and subsystem 
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correlations, and the effects of the failure modes and failure events; all must be identified for 
the operating conditions of the system.  An obvious failure mode for the components 
identified in the system is wearing out, and another one is simply not working.  For this 
research, the focus for all components is FM = not working (no functionality of the part).  
Using a handbook of failure rates will let this qualitative failure mode easily translate into a 
quantitative one for the next section, risk analysis.  The following function structure in 
Figure 16 would serve to help identify many more failure modes for each component in 
future analyses. 
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Figure 16: Identifying Component Failure Modes 
 
The components may be salvageable with this FM of ceasing to operate as intended or the 
components may need to be replaced as with other FMs.  The FMs identified as part of the 
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procedure represented by Figure 16 should guide the risk engineer towards potential 
consequences of the failure modes (which is a subsequent step to define the PFCs for FMs). 
For the chosen OC, continuous operation, there is a timeline of events that must occur for 
successful operation of the DCG system.  Originally, an event tree was to be constructed, 
but due to the FC-Based DCG system having no redundancy or parallel reliabilities and the 
focus on an FM of simply ceasing to operate (rather than other kinds of failure with myriad 
consequences), the operation sequence was sufficient.  Essentially, this means that all 
individual component failures would lead to total system failure.  The risk information 
gathered from the subsequent risk analysis will therefore be a “worst-case” scenario that will 
be useful in determining where CESHR should focus future research to bring the FC-Based 
DCG system to market.  The following Figure 17 should be more useful for organizing the 
event trees (or other risk methodologies) for other FC-Based DCG systems with 
redundancy. 
 
 
Figure 17: Identifying Failure Events 
 
The components acting in this operation sequence are depicted on the following page in 
Figure 18, where the “and” gates show that although some of the components act in parallel, 
all branches are necessary to the operation of the next component in the operational flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: FC-Based DCG Operation Sequence for Normal, Continuous Operation 
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Following the last two steps from the risk assessment function structure depicted 
previously in Figure 7, the system interfaces and the system risk consequences must be 
qualified.  Due to the simplifying assumptions previously discussed, interfaces are dealt with 
internal to the system.  As mentioned before, there is not much redundancy in the chosen 
FC-based DCG system; the consequences of the individual components not working are 
usually total system failure (PFC = system shutdown).  Even though there can be more than 
one failure consequence for a failure mode, other consequences will not be considered here.  
The results of the risk assessment portion are discussed in the next section following the 
discussion of the risk analysis procedure as applied to FC-Based DCG.   
Risk Review Analysis Procedure & Example Application 
The risk engineering procedure for analysis, as shown by the functional decomposition in 
Figure 19 on the following page, centers on the idea that analysis is a quantitative measure of 
a system’s risk.  This gives the risk reviewer an idea of what needs to be addressed in order 
to perform the risk analysis for the completion of the second task.  A “bottom-up” rating for 
each scenario previously identified by the assessment will be conducted at this point using 
standard risk industry practices.  Here the magnitude of the consequences is combined with 
the event likelihood to give a metric for each scenario, which can then be combined to a 
total system metric.  Some typical methodologies employed for this portion of the risk 
review are: event trees, failure rates, probabilistic risk analysis, scheduling network analysis, 
Monte Carlo simulations, reliability ranges for each component, Ishikawa “fishbone” 
diagrams, hazard analysis, and trade-off studies.  The function structure below is a 
decomposition of the risk analysis function discussed in Figure 2 as it applies to FC-Based 
DCG.  Like the assessment function previously discussed, it also illustrates the utility of the 
top-down design process for risk engineering by allowing for a determination of what should 
be considered before deciding how to analyze it.  The dashed analysis functions shown on 
the diagram in Figure 19 on the following page are performed repetitively for each 
component & operation found in the previous assessment. 
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Figure 19: Risk Review Analysis Functions (Research Focus) 
 
Before discussing the assignment of probabilities to the failure modes and then to the 
failure events, the last two functions from Figure 19 will be discussed.  First, the magnitude 
of the risk consequences are all that no electricity will be delivered to the end user and no 
heat will be exchanged with the site water.  This gives the “worst-case” scenario for the 
operational sequence.  There can be more than one magnitude of failure for a potential 
failure consequence.  Second, the combination into a system metric will be done with 
standard reliability equations while a Monte Carlo simulation will account for uncertainty.  A 
Monte Carlo simulation runs several “what-if” scenarios by iterating the system variables (in 
this case, failure data) through a range of values according to a specified distribution.   The 
random generation of these bounded data will change the output of interest (in this case, 
system reliability).  [1]  By simulating the model over 1,000 times a statistical feel for the 
likelihood of the outcome is developed.  
The calculations following in Equations (3) through (5) demonstrate some of the 
probability principles that were useful in finding an overall value of risk for the system.  As 
all products degrade over time (t), the probabilities are shown as functions of time.  First, the 
sum of the probability of failure (Pf(t)) & of success (Ps(t)) will always be unity. 
  (3) ( ) ( ) 1=+ tPtP sf
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Second, as most component data will be of the form of the mean time between failure 
(MTBF) of tested parts or in the form of failure per million hours (fpmh), some way to 
convert this into a probability is needed.  This allows for a Monte Carlo simulation to then 
turn component failure data into a reliability (R) or a probability of the success for the 
system by randomly choosing the fpmh from a specified range and distribution for each 
uncertain value and then tracking the effect of these variations on the system reliability.  The 
generally accepted equation to convert from fpmh or MTBF to a probability of success is as 
follows: 
 
MTBF
fpmhwhereePR
fpmht
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Last, many systems today are very complex, creating rather complex event structures 
leading to failures.  If the sub-events are independent, i.e. no common causes, a means to 
account for the complexity of these sub-events is to multiply each sub-event probability.  
Alternately, if all sub-events have the same probability, raise the success probability for a 
single event to a power equal to the number of sub-events (N).  This development may also 
be applied to the total probability from a number (n) of the same components in a system of 
several (N) different types of components. 
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Figure 20 on the following page shows the first repetitive subgroup from Figure 19 
applied to the FM for each PC previously identified by the risk assessment.  Since there was 
only one FM of not working, finding the value of the probability of failure for the standard 
components is relatively easy as there exists many sources of failure data.  On the other 
hand, the failure data for the new components will have to be estimated from experience.  
One could perform experiments to obtain the failure data of new components, however that 
is outside of the scope of this research.  Estimates are widely used and accepted as standard 
engineering practice. 
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Figure 20: Analysis of Component Failure Modes 
 
At this point in the risk engineering process the failure data, which is when the component 
would not work as intended, for the individual components was gathered.  Most component 
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data for the BOP and some parts of the fuel cell stack were obtained as failures per million 
hours (fpmh) from the Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data Handbook and are repeated here 
with the significant figures shown in the handbook in the unshaded cells.  [9]  However, 
since this handbook did not cover the reliability of the MEA, Ni-Foam, bipolar plates, and 
the reformer, these components were estimated from laboratory experience of the MTBF in 
the shaded cells.  Table 2 gives the failure values found for normal operation. 
Table 2: FC-Based DCG Component Failure Data for Normal Components 
Variable Component Name Subsystem # of Comp. Median fpmh 
pc1 membrane electrode assembly  Fuel Cell 80 200 
pc2 nickel foam  Fuel Cell 160 100 
pc3 bipolar plate Fuel Cell 81 0.1 
pc4 rubber gasket Fuel Cell 160 0.0597 
pc5 tie rod (bolt) Fuel Cell 12 2.7835 
pc6 nut Fuel Cell 12 0.5744 
pc7 threaded NPT brass connector Fuel Cell 3 5.9243 
pc8 water particulate filter  Fuel 1 17.4825 
pc9 reverse osmosis filter Fuel 1 49.519 
pc10 water pump  Fuel 1 342.377 
pc11 control valve Fuel 2 107.346 
pc12 air particulate filter Fuel 2 51.2821 
pc13 light-duty compressor (2atm, 100cu.cm) Fuel 1 193.7094 
pc14 desulfurizer (CH4 & N2) & reformer (adiabatic) Fuel 1 20 
pc15 Root’s blower (size for dP in stack) Fuel 1 3.3029 
pc16 regenerative blower (just for dP) Fuel 1 3.3029 
pc17 hydrogen humidifier Fuel 1 33.435 
pc18 oxygen humidifier Fuel 1 33.435 
pc19 1-way control valve (5 cu.ft./min) Fuel 1 107.346 
pc20 (90 ft) stainless (or Cu) 3/8 inch tubing Fuel 1 2.047 
pc21 heat exchanger/condenser Exhaust 1 9.9894 
pc22 reservoir Exhaust 1 3.37 
pc23 diaphragm pump (100W max) Exhaust 1 342.377 
pc24 control valve Exhaust 1 107.346 
pc25 compressor (lower dP than pc16) Exhaust 1 16.0894 
pc26 fuel cell cooler  Exhaust 1 9.9894 
pc27 pump (200W) Exhaust 1 342.377 
pc28 (11 ft) stainless3/8 inch tubing Exhaust 1 2.047 
pc29 (2 ft) 00 wire Pwr Cond 1 0.1877 
pc30 inverter Pwr Cond 1 5.0851 
pc31 master controller Control 1 0.0486 
pc32 sensors Control 50 3.6125 
pc33 (50 ft) 18 wire Control 1 0.2203 
    
Obtained from 
NPRD-95 
    
Calculated from 
MTBF estimate 
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To turn these failure data from Table 2 into reliabilities, Equation (4) presented above was 
used to calculate the most likely reliability for each PC.  For analysis of the system, a 
triangular distribution was assumed for each component with a ± 50% range of failure 
values.  Other distributions could have been chosen, such as the Weibull distribution, the 
uniform distribution, or the Gaussian (normal) distribution.  The following Figure 21 depicts 
the most likely value, the range and the distribution for pc1 as used in the subsequent 
analysis.  The risk analysis distribution and values (range and most likely) for the other PCs 
are included in Appendix A. 
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Figure 21: Risk Analysis Values & Probability Distribution for pc1
 
Figure 22 on the following page shows the second repetitive subgroup of the risk analysis 
function structure from Figure 19 applied to the FEs previously identified from the risk 
assessment. 
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Figure 22: Analysis of Operational Failure Events 
 
Care must be taken in combining individual component reliabilities into system reliabilities 
because the combination changes depending on if the components are in series, in parallel, 
or are redundant components.  For independent components in general, the reliabilities for 
components in series are multiplicative, the reliabilities for components in parallel are 
inversely additive, and the reliabilities for redundant components in parallel additive are 
added with the multiplied reliability subtracted.  A standby redundant system, where the 
operation switches from the failed component to start operating a new component, uses a 
Poisson process and is not applicable to the current research.  [10]  This is illustrated with 
the following three Equations (6) through (8). 
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   for two continuously redundant reliabilities in parallel (8) 2121 *RRRRRredundant −+=
For example, take the following four components, A, B, C, and D.  Components B and C 
are redundant for each other, and this combination is in series with both components A and 
D.  This is illustrated graphically in Figure 23 below. 
 
 
Figure 23: Reliability Example 
 
Applying Equations (6) and (8), the total reliability for this simple system is 
.  However, if B and C had been reliabilities in parallel with 
each other, Equation (7) would have been used in place of Equation (8).  Thus, the total 
reliability for the system would have been 
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In the case of the FC-Based DCG, no redundancy and no parallel reliabilities exist for the 
original, non-risk controlled case.  Therefore, the total system reliability is calculated by 
applying the principle discussed above for Equation (6) and for Equation (5).  This results in 
the following Equation (9) where N = 33 PCs in this case and n is the number of 
component i in the system design. 
   (9) ( )[ npcNisys iRR 1=Π=
 
  41 
The times chosen for evaluation were t = 1 hour, 5 hours, 10 hours, 50 hours, 100 hours 
and 500 hours of continuous operation.  The approach used for finding the deterministic 
risk of the system was simply to apply the series reliability equation to the “most likely” 
median values of the transformed failure data for the components at each desired evaluation 
time.  However, this deterministic reliability is not able to give a likelihood of the system 
actually having that value.  At most it would give a bound on the system limits by plotting 
the low and high reliability combinations as a measure of the uncertainty band.   
The approach for finding the probabilistic risk of the system was to use the Crystal Ball 
(CB) software from Decisioneering  in Excel to perform 5,000 Monte Carlo trials for each 
evaluation time.  The range (high and low reliability values) and distribution were defined for 
each of the failure rates for the components (pc1 through pc33), and the total system 
reliability for each time evaluated was set as a “forecast value”.  This meant that whenever 
the CB package randomly chose the values for each component, the resulting effect on the 
total system reliability was recorded.  [1]  This allowed for a probability of the reliability of 
the system (or the probability of system success) at each evaluation time.  The following 
Figure 24 shows the reliability recorded at the second evaluated time (t = 5 hours) by CB 
where the predicted reliability of the system is 84% with the possibility of a reliability value 
ranging from 79% to 89%.  The standard deviation of the system reliability at this evaluated 
time is 0.02. 
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Figure 24: Distribution of Reliability for t = 5 hours 
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All other forecast values have similar graphs and data statistics (standard deviation, range) 
presented in a report generated by CB.  The Excel spreadsheet setup and the CB report are 
included in Appendix A.  The analysis in the appendix includes the deterministic evaluation 
of the system reliability mentioned previously.  Figure 25 below depicts the reliability of the 
current configuration of the FC-Based DCG system with the 100% confidence bands for the 
evaluated times.  Incidentally, CB does not allow for significant figure changes to the axis. 
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Figure 25: Variation of FC-Based DCG System Reliability with Evaluated Operating Times 
 
This trend diagram takes the distribution of the reliability for each time and plots the 
information as a vertical band of confidence according to the pattern scheme depicts to the 
right of the graph.  For instance, since the predicted reliability of the system recorded at the 
second evaluated time (t = 5 hours) by CB is 84% the 10% confidence band is centered at an 
84% probability of system success.  Since the evaluated time had the possibility of a 
reliability value ranging from 79% to 89%, the 100% confidence band stretches from 79% to 
89% of the system reliability. 
As can be seen from the trends, the major problem with the FC-Based DCG system is 
that the original system with normal component failure values is certain to have system 
failure after 400 hours of use (275 hours by the deterministic method which did not use 
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Monte Carlo simulation and from which no likelihood of the reliability could be 
determined).  The system is essentially unacceptable after 100 hours of use.  This could be 
due to the fact that the system has no redundancy and to the quality of the components (i.e. 
high fpmh data).  Also the CB sensitivity analysis showed the MEA to be the most risky 
component at each evaluation time.  This is evidenced by the information in Table 3 
following showing the top four correlations to the system reliability.  Essentially, the closer 
the correlation value is to unity, the more effect that component has on the total system 
reliability for that evaluated time.  The FC-Based DCG system is so sensitive to the value of 
the fpmh for the MEA and Ni-Foam due to the fact that there are so many of those two 
components types. 
 
Table 3: FC-Based DCG System Sensitivity Analysis 
Components 
Rsys, t=1 
hour 
Rsys, t=5 
hours 
Rsys, t=10 
hours 
Rsys, t=50 
hours 
Rsys, 
t=100 
hours 
Rsys, 
t=500 
hours 
Original System 
MEA -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 
Ni-Foam -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 
Control Valve (fuel) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Bipolar Plate 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Reformer -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Sensors -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Diaphragm Pump -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Water Pump (fuel) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 
 
This information is valuable; however experience with PEM FCs has shown that when 
properly humidified and fueled with pure hydrogen, an MEA does not stop working.  The 
MEA will only fail if some other component fails and then disturbs the conditions under 
which the MEA needs to operate.  Also, the Ni-Foam, when gold-plated, seems to resist 
corrosion rather well.  Further investigation was needed to determine the other components 
that affect the total system reliability since the MEA and the Ni-Foam dominate this 
sensitivity analysis. 
In order to better understand how the BOP affects the total system reliability, a revised 
system was created where, instead of calculating a reliability as before, the reliability of the 
MEA and the Ni-Foam were set to unity (R=1, 100% reliable).  The failure data was still that 
of normal quality for the other components (calculated R).  The Excel spreadsheet setup and 
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the CB report are included in Appendix B.  The analysis in the appendix also includes a 
deterministic evaluation of the revised system reliability.  Figure 26 following depicts the 
reliability of the revised configuration of the FC-Based DCG system, with the 100% 
confidence bands for the evaluated times. 
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Figure 26: Variation of Revised System Reliability with Evaluated Operating Times 
 
As can bee seen by comparing Figure 25 with Figure 26, the variability (width of the 
uncertainty band) of the FC-Based DCG system is greatly reduced and it should be 
acceptable at and under 100 hours (average R100 = 80%).  The reliability at the 500 hour 
evaluated time is still disappointing at an average of approximately R500 = 33%.  The CB 
sensitivity analysis now tells a different story, without the MEA and Ni-Foam in the Monte 
Carlo simulation.  The top six most correlated components are the pumps and valves, which 
are also those components with the highest failure rates (fpmh values), as well as the sensors 
which is the most numerous component type still in the simulation.  This is evidenced by the 
data in Table 4 on the following page. 
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Table 4: Revised System Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Data 
Rsys, t=1 
hour 
Rsys, t=5 
hours 
Rsys, t=10 
hours 
Rsys, t=50 
hours 
Rsys, 
t=100 
hours 
Rsys, 
t=500 
hours 
Revised System 
Diaphragm Pump -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 
Pump (exhaust) -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
Water Pump (fuel) -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
Control Valve (fuel) -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 
Compressor (fuel) -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 
Sensors -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
 
 
The results for the risk analysis portion of risk engineering for this FC-Based DCG system 
are discussed in the next section.  The results and recommendations section below will also 
give some suggestions on how to manage this system reliability, which is still poor after the 
revision of the MEA and Ni-Foam individual reliabilities.   Repeated CB simulations will also 
be presented and discussed to show the potential impacts of the proposed changes to the 
FC-Based DCG system. 
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RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
From the necessary tasks to satisfy the objectives several results have followed from this 
research.  From the first task, to identify the necessary elements of a risk engineering 
process, the functions of risk engineering were determined and compared with the literature 
in the field.  A major result for this research came from the fulfillment of second task, to 
develop a procedure for reviewing risk, and that procedure should be followed for future 
risk reviews of FC-Based DCG.  Figures 7 and 19 showed the functional decomposition of 
what needed to be addressed in order to perform the risk assessment and risk analysis, 
respectively, for part of the completion of the second task. 
After creating the procedure for both risk assessment and risk analysis, the procedure was 
tested with an example system based on the one used by CESHR in completion of the third 
task.  The results for the risk assessment portion are: a set of components, a developed 
component sequence of operation, a potential mode of failure to be evaluated, and a 
scenario (with several more suggested) for analysis.  The results for the risk analysis portion 
are: a set of two end states for the chosen continuous operation scenario ranging from 
complete success to total failure, the probabilities associated with the scenario, and the 
distribution of that probability (relating to the confidence in the system’s risk rating) for the 
evaluated times.  The original system gave extremely high sensitivities to two components 
that, in common practice, do not normally fail on their own.  That is, the MEA and Ni-
Foam usually fail as a result of some BOP component failure.  Therefore, a revised system 
with the reliability of those two components set to 100% was also analyzed. 
Three risk reduction activities were chosen to improve overall system reliability for the 
revised system: 1) to add a redundant Fuel Cell to the revised system, 2) to make the FC-
Based DCG system more robust by using higher quality components, and 3) to do both (add 
redundancy and robustness).  When adding a redundant FC to the revised system, the 
probability of system success improves incrementally (averages R100 = 80.7% and R500 = 
34%) while the uncertainty band narrows slightly.  This trend can readily be seen by Figure 
27 on the following page and by noting its similarity to the previous Figure 26. 
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Figure 27: Variation of Reliability for Revised, Redundant FC System with Evaluated Times 
 
The Excel spreadsheet setup and the CB report are included in Appendix C.  The analysis 
in the appendix also includes a deterministic evaluation of the revised, redundant FC system 
reliability. 
The failure rate data for the FC-Based DCG system high quality components is listed on 
the following page in Table 5, where the shaded cells in the “Variable” column showcase the 
changed components and the shaded cells in the median fmph column still signify a 
calculated failure value from an estimated MTBF.  The unshaded cells in the median fpmh 
column still represent data gathered from NPRD-95, with the significant figures repeated 
here as they were reported in the handbook.  [9] 
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Table 5: FC-Based DCG Component Failure Data for High Quality Components 
Variable Component Name Subsystem # of Comp. Median fpmh 
pc3 bipolar plate Fuel Cell 81 0.01 
pc4 rubber gasket Fuel Cell 160 0.0597 
pc5 tie rod (bolt) Fuel Cell 12 2.7835 
pc6 nut Fuel Cell 12 0.5744 
pc7 threaded NPT brass connector Fuel Cell 3 5.9243 
pc8 water particulate filter  Fuel 1 6.8112 
pc9 reverse osmosis filter Fuel 1 2.6455 
pc10 water pump  Fuel 1 181.3384 
pc11 control valve Fuel 1 0.2912 
pc12 air particulate filter Fuel 2 0.078 
pc13 light-duty compressor (2atm, 100cu.cm) Fuel 1 10.3061 
pc14 desulfurizer & reformer (adiabatic) Fuel 1 10 
pc15 Root’s blower (size for dP in stack) Fuel 1 0.5294 
pc16 regenerative blower (just for dP) Fuel 1 0.5294 
pc17 hydrogen humidifier Fuel 1 0.6261 
pc18 oxygen humidifier Fuel 1 0.6261 
pc19 1-way control valve (5 cu.ft./min) Fuel 1 0.2912 
pc20 (90 ft) stainless (or Cu) 3/8 inch tubing Fuel 1 0.7415 
pc21 heat exchanger/condenser Exhaust 1 9.9894 
pc22 reservoir Exhaust 1 2.2483 
pc23 diaphragm pump (100W max) Exhaust 1 181.3384 
pc24 control valve Exhaust 1 0.2912 
pc25 compressor (lower dP than pc16) Exhaust 1 16.0894 
pc26 fuel cell cooler  Exhaust 1 9.9894 
pc27 pump (200W) Exhaust 1 181.3384 
pc28 (11 ft) stainless (or Cu) 3/8 inch tubing Exhaust 1 0.7415 
pc29 (2 ft) 00 wire Pwr Cond 1 0.1877 
pc30 inverter Pwr Cond 1 5.0851 
pc31 master controller Control 1 0.0486 
pc32 sensors Control 50 3.6125 
pc33 (50 ft) 18 wire Control 1 0.2203 
Normal 
quality    
Obtained from 
NPRD-95 
Higher 
quality    
Calculated from 
MTBF estimate 
 
 
When increasing the robustness of the FC-Based DCG System by using higher quality 
components, the overall system reliability improves.  With these changes, the system might 
now be acceptable between 100 and 500 hours.  This trend is evidenced by Figure 28 on the 
following page, note the change of scale resulting in an average R500 = 65%. 
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Figure 28: Variation of Reliability for Robust System with Evaluated Times 
 
The Excel spreadsheet setup and the CB report are included in Appendix D.  The analysis 
in the appendix also includes a deterministic evaluation of the robust system reliability.   
When increasing robustness of the revised FC-Based DCG system as well as adding a 
redundant FC, not only do the reliability values improve over the revised system (R500 = 
66.9%), but also the uncertainty band decreases slightly.  The reliability of the robust, 
redundant system is not greatly improved over the robust system alone.  This trend is 
evidenced by Figure 29 on the following page. 
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Figure 29: Variation of Reliability for Robust, Redundant FC System with Evaluated Times 
 
The Excel spreadsheet setup and the CB report are included in Appendix E.  The analysis 
in the appendix also includes a deterministic evaluation of the robust, redundant FC system 
reliability. 
The information in Table 6 on the following page lists the results of the sensitivity analysis 
on the system: the top six correlations for each suggested risk control scenario.  The 
sensitivity in some situations had more than one component with the same correlation, so 
for some scenarios more than six correlated components are shown. 
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Table 6: Sensitivty Analysis for Risk Control Scenarios 
Sensitivity Data 
Rsys, t=1 
hour 
Rsys, t=5 
hours 
Rsys, t=10 
hours 
Rsys, t=50 
hours 
Rsys, 
t=100 
hours 
Rsys, 
t=500 
hours 
Revised, Redundant FC System 
Water Pump (fuel) -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 
Pump (exhaust) -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 
Diaphragm Pump -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
Control Valve (fuel) -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 
Compressor (fuel) -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 
Sensors -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
Robust System 
Sensors -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 
Pump (exhaust) -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 
Water Pump (fuel) -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 
Diaphragm Pump -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 
Tie Rod -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
Gasket -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Robust, Redundant FC System 
Pump (exhaust) -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 
Diaphragm Pump -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 
Water Pump (fuel) -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 
Sensors -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 
Compressor (exhaust) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Tubing (exhaust) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Air Filter -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Tie Rod -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
Control Valve (fuel) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Bipolar Plate -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Connector -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
 
A brief review of the trends in the probabilistic system risk diagrams, as shown in Figures 
25 and 26 presented in the previous “Risk Review Analysis” section as well as Figures 27 
through 29, allows for the following findings to be stated.  Adding a continuously redundant 
FC to the revised system slightly improves the FC-Based DCG system.  This is 
demonstrated by the slightly decreased slope ranging from the 10 hour through the 500 
hours evaluations, and a small decrease in the width of the uncertainty band.  Adding 
robustness improves the FC-Based DCG system more than simply adding redundancy, 
which is evidenced by the increase in actual reliability values in all time ranges evaluated.  
Therefore, system robustness would be recommended to the implementers of FC-Based 
DCG over FC redundancy. 
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From the sensitivity analysis provided by Crystal Ball and presented in Tables 3, 4, and 6 
several findings may be extracted (full sensitivity analyses are supplied in the appendices of 
this report with the system to which they pertain).  The MEA was the component to which 
the risk was most sensitive at all times evaluated for the original system.  The pumps were 
the components which were highly correlated with the system risk in the revised system and 
in all risk control strategies.  It is therefore recommended that CESHR investigate using 
redundancy, both continuous and standby, for these components in order to see what that 
risk control strategy would do to the system risk. 
The probability of each scenario, when combined with its consequences, allows risk 
engineers to discover the most important risks about which something must be done.  What 
to do about them is precisely what the risk management function should determine.  The 
initial part of the fourth task, to make recommendations according to the data generated 
from the analysis, is as far as this research goes.  It is a company’s responsibility to complete 
the management in order to complete the risk engineering process and is outside the scope 
of this research.  One of the scenarios presented here would need to be decided upon and 
implemented in order to fulfill the risk management for a FC-Based DCG system. 
By no means does this thesis cover the end of research in this area.  It is more like a first 
step towards a better, more marketable system.  More simulations should be run on other 
failure modes for the current operating condition, and on other operating conditions, which 
would require the development of more operational sequence diagrams.  The risk control 
strategy of redundancy for other components, such as the pumps, should be investigated.  
Also, more research is needed in order to obtain more accurate estimates for the reliability of 
the Ni-Foam assembly, the bipolar plates, and the reformer, which could also lead to a better 
understanding of other failure modes for these components.  It is recommended that 
CESHR therefore focus on improving the performance of the system by using high quality 
components.  The performance of the system as a whole could be improved by adding 
redundancy for components other than the FC; it is recommended to investigate both 
continuous and standby redundancy. 
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SUMMARY 
Completing the first task needed to reach the research objectives provided the 
identification of the necessary elements of the risk engineering process.  Completing the 
second task, CESHR was provided with a procedure for reviewing risk specifically in FC-
Based DCG systems, which should be an invaluable deliverable.  In completion of the third 
task, a complete example system configuration has a documented risk assessment and a risk 
analysis.  The deliverables from this risk review are that it should be easy to understand the 
procedure for one familiar with the subject with a fully worked out example and that the 
procedure was verified by being applied to an example.  The risk review produced 
probabilities associated with two of the various possible end states of the system – from 
complete success to total failure of the FC-Based DGC – and the details of how each 
element of the system contributes to these probabilities.  System design change 
recommendations were made according to the data generated from the risk analysis for the 
system identified with the risk assessment and included possible changes to the elements that 
contributed the most to the risk.  However, completing the final task, system design changes, 
would have to be performed by an implementer of the system as only they are able to 
determine how much risk reduction is worth the cost to them.  The major deliverables from 
this research are the useful conclusions which CESHR will be able to draw in terms of the 
design configuration of physical and operating characteristics for a FC-Based DCG system 
which will be the least technologically risky. 
The design approach was indeed able to organize, systematize, and clarify all the 
background information for risk engineering and simplify the application to an example FC-
Based DCG system.  The current FC-Based DCG design parameters in the operating 
condition of continuous running that contribute the most to the technological system risk of 
not working were the MEA, the Ni-foam flow field, and the pumps.  By making the system 
more robust, essentially by using high quality components, the FC-Based DCG system 
reliability improves significantly over the original and over the revised system. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
From the information presented in the results and discussion section above as well as in 
the appendices several conclusion may be drawn from this research. 
The reliability of the typical FC-Based DCG system should be relatively constant and 
acceptable initially and then drop off significantly to an unacceptable level after a certain 
point in time.  The system design will need to ensure that this decrease in reliability occurs 
after the end user is ready to purchase a new system or design some maintenance schedule to 
prolong the acceptable reliability period. 
The MEA and the Ni-Foam are the two components that should contribute the most to 
the system reliability since there exists such a great number of those components in the FC-
Based DCG system.  When considering the MEAs and Ni-Foam assemblies to be 100% 
reliable, the next components to which the system reliability is most sensitive are the pumps.  
Thus, any improvements to the pumps will improve the entire FC-Based DCG system.  The 
sensitivity  of the system to various components may or may not vary with time. 
The improvement of the robustness of the individual components should have a positive 
impact on system reliability, with the most impact resulting from improving those 
components to which the system is most sensitive.  Adding redundancy for the fuel cell 
system provides a minimal improvement to the FC-Based DCG system reliability; however 
other redundancy options for other components like the pumps should be explored to fully 
understand how redundancy affects the system. 
The design approach will continue to be useful in assessing, analyzing, and managing risk 
large complex systems, such as FC-Based DCG, since it collapses the overarching goals into 
smaller, accomplishable portions. 
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ACRONYMS 
ABBREVIATION MEANING 
AC Alternating Current 
BANANA Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anybody 
BOP Balance of Plant 
CB Crystal Ball® (by Decisioneering®) 
CESHR Center for Electrochemical Systems and Hydrogen Research 
CHP Combined Heat and Power 
DC Direct Current 
DCG Distributed (Power & Heat) Cogeneration 
DOE Department of Energy 
EPA United States’ Environmental Protection Agency  
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
FC Fuel Cell 
FE Failure Events 
FM Failure Modes 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
fpmh Failures per Million Hours 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
IC Internal Combustion 
LR Legal Requirements 
MEA Membrane Electrode Assembly 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
Ni-Foam Nickel-Metal Foam Flow Field Assembly 
NIMBY Not in My Backyard! 
OC Operating Characteristics 
PAMT Provide a Means To… 
PC Physical System Configurations 
PEM Polymer Electrolyte Membrane (also: Proton Exchange Membrane) 
PFC Potential Failure Consequences 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
R Reliability 
RAGS Risk Assessment Guidelines 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Original System 
 
In the accompanying zip file there is a Microsoft Excel file named “AppendixA 
Calculations.xls”.  The worksheets within the Excel file use the Crystal Ball add-in software 
from Decisioneering to evaluate the original system reliability at the evaluated times of t=1, 
5, 10, 50, 100, and 500 hours.  This system uses normal quality components.  There are also 
worksheets which evaluate only the low, median, and high values of the system reliability at 
the same times, representing a deterministic approach. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Revised System 
 
In the accompanying zip file there is a Microsoft Excel file named “AppendixB 
Calculations.xls”.  The worksheets within the Excel file use the Crystal Ball add-in software 
from Decisioneering to evaluate the revised system reliability at the evaluated times of t=1, 
5, 10, 50, 100, and 500 hours.  This system uses normal quality components, with the MEA 
and Ni-Foam Assembly reliability revised to 1.  There are also worksheets which evaluate 
only the low, median, and high values of the system reliability at the same times, representing 
a deterministic approach. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Revised, Redundant FC System 
 
In the accompanying zip file there is a Microsoft Excel file named “AppendixC 
Calculations.xls”.  The worksheets within the Excel file use the Crystal Ball add-in software 
from Decisioneering to evaluate the revised, redundant FC system reliability at the evaluated 
times of t=1, 5, 10, 50, 100, and 500 hours.  This system uses normal quality components, 
with the MEA and Ni-Foam Assembly reliability revised to 1 and an additional, continuously 
redundant, FC.  There are also worksheets which evaluate only the low, median, and high 
values of the system reliability at the same times, representing a deterministic approach. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Robust System 
 
In the accompanying zip file there is a Microsoft Excel file named “AppendixD 
Calculations.xls”.  The worksheets within the Excel file use the Crystal Ball add-in software 
from Decisioneering to evaluate the robust system reliability at the evaluated times of t=1, 5, 
10, 50, 100, and 500 hours.  This system uses high quality components, with the MEA and 
Ni-Foam Assembly reliability revised to 1.  There are also worksheets which evaluate only 
the low, median, and high values of the system reliability at the same times, representing a 
deterministic approach. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Robust, Redundant FC System 
 
In the accompanying zip file there is a Microsoft Excel file named “AppendixE 
Calculations.xls”.  The worksheets within the Excel file use the Crystal Ball add-in software 
from Decisioneering to evaluate the robust, redundant FC system reliability at the evaluated 
times of t=1, 5, 10, 50, 100, and 500 hours.  This system uses high quality components, with 
the MEA and Ni-Foam Assembly reliability revised to 1 and an additional, continuously 
redundant, FC.  There are also worksheets which evaluate only the low, median, and high 
values of the system reliability at the same times, representing a deterministic approach. 
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